The costs and benefits of democratic deliberation

Do you know the old fable of Buridan's Ass? Where a donkey dies because it cannot decide whether to drink first or eat first.

On that note: I have a new research article out in Constitutional Political Economy, co-authored with economist Urs Steiner Brandt. We take on the issue of "democratic deliberation" and ask: When is too much of a good thing too much? Through a mathematical model and some simulations, we demonstrate that even in relatively small groups the costs of spending more time deliberating / getting more people on board may actually exceed the benefits of doing so.  At some point it is better to stop deliberating and making a decision.

 

Here is the abstract:

"Deliberation may increase the quality of decisions but also necessarily takes time and effort and hence will have costs. But proponents of deliberative democracy as an attractive or superior method for making decisions almost all focus on presumed benefits while in practice ignoring the costs associated with investing time and resources in the process of deliberation. We show that the cost side significantly influences the performance of the deliberative process. Through a number of simulations, we demonstrate that there must be a certain point beyond which the costs of deliberating will outweigh the potential benefits. Since this type of processes invariably will be time consuming, especially when the convergence of the participants towards a common goal is slow, conditions are derived where the deliberative process performs relatively well or relatively poorly, both as concerns the probability of reaching an agreement and in the net benefits to the participants. This is especially the case when the number of participants increase."

 

Empirical social choice - special issue of "Public Choice"

Does modern democracy produce outcomes preferred by a majority of the voters? One would think that this must be so.

But not necessarily.  Since the 1950s social scientists have been interested in those instances where there is a potential discrepancy between individual preferences and collective choices. For example, individuals are usually assumed to have "transitive" preferences; say, I like foie gras more than pasta and pasta more than shrimps--therefore we may assume that I like foie gras more than shrimps.  If I do not, then most people would find my ordering somewhat odd.

But when more than two such individual preferences over more than two alternatives are aggregated as a social choice (e.g. through a vote), we may get "intransitive" collective preferences--e.g.,

foie gras > pasta > shrimps > foie gras.

This "voting paradox"--most famously developed by Condorcet and in modern days applied by Kenneth Arrow and William H. Riker--has profound implications for how we may view not only democratic decisions but politics in general.  Alas, while thousands and thousands of studies have been made of the theoretical aspects of such phenomena, the empirical side is much less studied.

Since the late 1990s a large part of my own research agenda has been devoted to such issues (e.g., cycles in voter preferences [paper here], voting paradoxes in proportional electoral systems [gated paper here] and election inversions [gated paper here; ungated version here]).  The most recent issue of "Public Choice" is a special issue on "Empirical Social Choice", guest edited by myself and--on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of William H. Riker's seminal book "Liberalism against Populism" (1982)--devoted to empirical studies of voting paradoxes and the effects of different voting methods.

I have two papers in the special issue myself: 1) An general introduction devoted to Riker's book and its implications, as well as an overview of the contributions to the special issue ("Empirical social choice: An introduction", gated paper here; ungated version here); 2) an analysis of the 1975 government formation in Denmark ("Picking a loser?", gated paper here; ungated version here).  In the latter I argue that the process made visible a flaw in the Danish procedures: Given the preferences of the political parties and the system of "negative parliamentarism", the Danish political system ended up with what was possibly only the third ranked government alternative, one supported only by a minority in parliament.  Different procedures might well have produced what was the majority preferred outcome: A centre-right government led by Poul Hartling.

The special issue contains a number of interesting contributions by prominent political scientists and economists such as John Aldrich, Steven Brams, Josep Colomer, Keith Dougherty, Bernard Grofman, Nicholas Miller, Michael Munger, Mogens N. Pedersen, Bjørn Erik Rasch, Norman Schofield, Nic Tideman and Ad Van Deemen.

Interessant forskning: Berg & Henrekson om offentlige udgifter/økonomisk vækst

De to fremragende svenske økonomer Andreas Bergh og Magnus Henrekson har fornylig fået udgivet deres interessante paper "Government Size and Growth: A Survey and Interpretation of the Evidence" i Journal of Economic Surveys.  Her er en tidligere udgave og dette sammendrag:

"The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach – of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time – reveals a more consistent picture: The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5 to 1 percent lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth: One hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy. Another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market-friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by ongoing research."